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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues1
The Iraqi Special Tribunal (“the Court” or “IST”), also known as the Iraqi High
Criminal Court or the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, has jurisdiction over cases involving
“[t]he abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or
the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country, in accordance with Article 1
of Law Number 7 of 1958, as amended.”2 On September 17, 1980, Iraq claimed that the
Iranian Shat al-Arab waterway was part of Iraq, and, on September 22, 1980, Iraq
invaded Iran. A decade later, on August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and, on August 8,
1990, Iraq declared the annexation of Kuwait to the state of Iraq. This memorandum
examines whether either of these Iraqi invasions constitutes the crime of aggression,
which the IST has jurisdiction to try as outlined in Article 14 (c) of the Statute of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal (“IST Statute”).
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Article 14(c) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Establishes a
Prohibition Against State Aggression.
The Iraqi Special Tribunal has jurisdiction over cases involving “[t]he abuse of
position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of the
armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country, in accordance with Article 1 of Law
Number 7 of 1958, as amended.”3 The recognition, in Article 1 of Law Number 7 of

1

ISSUE: What are the contours of the crime of aggression in international law as it would apply to the Iraqi
attack on Iran and the Iraqi attack on Kuwait? What defenses are uniquely available with respect to this
crime?
2

See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 14(c), at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm
[hereinafter IST Statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
3

Id.

1

1958, of behavior that plots “against the security of the State” reinforces the similarities
between Article 14(c) of the IST Statute and the definition of the state crime of
aggression from international legal precedent.
2. The Iraqi Invasion of Iran May Constitute a State Crime of Aggression.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter prohibits a U.N. member state’s
threat or use of force against the “territorial integrity or political independence” of any
other state.4 However, the U.N. recognizes that a state may threaten or use force when
the U.N. Security Council approves or when the state must defend itself from another
state’s armed attack.5 General Assembly (G.A.) Resolution 3314 provides a definition of
“aggression.”6 The International Court of Justice has looked to this definition as a source
representing customary international law.7
Iraq’s invasion of Iran and Iraq’s annexation of the Shatt al-Arab are actions
fitting under the G.A. Resolution 3314 definition of state aggression. The Security
Council did not approve Iraq’s invasion of Iran. Therefore, to justify invading Iran, Iraq
must establish that Iraq’s invasion of Iran was self-defense or another exception to the
Article 2(4) prohibition against threat or use of force against another state. A claim that
Iraq used force against Iran in self-defense may succeed because assassination attempts
can trigger the legitimate use of self-defense. However, the continuing boundary dispute
between Iraq and Iran did not trigger the right to self-defense. Iraq’s claim of

4

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33].

5

U.N. CHARTER art. 51. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36].

6

G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (quoted infra, notes 50-51)
[hereinafter Res. 3314] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

7

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Lexis 4, 215-216 (June 27, 1986)
[hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S.] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37].

2

anticipatory self-defense ultimately fails because any threat that Iran posed did not
necessitate an immediate use of force and because Iraq’s invasion of Iran and annexation
of the Shatt al-Arab was not proportional to any threat that Iran presented to Iraq.
3. The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait Constituted a State Crime of Aggression.
Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait are actions fitting under the G.A.
Resolution 3314 definition of state aggression. As with Iraq’s invasion of Iran, the U.N.
did not approve Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Rather, the U.N. Security Council
immediately and specifically demanded that Iraq cease its invasion of Kuwait.8
Therefore, Iraq must show that its invasion of Kuwait was a valid act of self-defense,
anticipatory self-defense, or, possibly, humanitarian intervention. Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait did not meet the requirements for any of these exceptions.9 Additionally, Iraq’s
use of force against Kuwait was not necessary or proportional to any immediate threat
that Kuwait presented to Iraq.
4. Article 14(c) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Establishes
Jurisdiction Over Crimes Roughly Equivalent to the Crime of Aggression.
The language of Article 14(c) of the IST Statute, combined with the language of
Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958, establishes the IST’s jurisdiction over crimes
roughly equivalent to the crime of aggression. The IST Statute prohibits direct or
participatory actions10 that might lead to Iraq’s use of force in one of the prohibited acts

8

S.C. Res. 660., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
17].

9

See Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
41 (1991) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 48].

THE USE OF FORCE 37,
10

Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958, Iraq, e-mail from Michael A. Newton to Michael Scharf on
September 30, 2005. (a plotter against the security of the State is anyone who used “his influence in
committing or participating in any acts mentioned below”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 1].

3

listed in Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958.11 This prohibition of direct and
participatory actions leading to acts of force against another state echoes the Nuremberg
Charter’s definition of crimes of aggression.12 Also, the list in Article 1 of Law Number
7 of 1958, which prohibits specific uses of force, resembles and, at times, parallels, the
list of actions that the General Assembly designated as acts of aggression in Article 3 of
its Resolution 3314 definition of aggression.13
5. Under Article 14(c) of Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the Iraqi
Special Tribunal May Not Be Able to Prosecute Members of the Former
Regime for the Crime of Aggression for the Invasion of Iran Because Iran
is Not an Arab State.
Before an individual may be culpable for the crime of aggression, the adjudicator
must find that the individual’s state has committed the state crime of aggression against
another state. 14 If the IST finds that Iraq’s invasion of Iran was a state crime of
aggression, in violation of Article 14(c) of the IST Statute, then the IST may prosecute
officials for the crime of aggression for their participation in the state crime.
Article 14(c) of the IST Statute and Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958 give the
IST jurisdiction to prosecute individuals only for Iraqi invasions of “Arab countries.”15

11

Id.

12

Charter of the International Military Tribunal (1945), at
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (Nuremberg Charter) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
13

Res. 3314, supra note 6. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

14

Mohammed M. Gomaa, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression and the ICC Jurisdiction over that
Crime, in THE ICC AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 55, 65 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46].
15

IST Statute, supra note 2, at art. 14. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30]; Article 1(a)
of Law Number 7 of 1958, supra note 10 (The text of Article 1(b) does not include punctuation.)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

4

Since the international community does not identify Iran as an Arab state, and since Iran
does not share the territory, language, or culture of other Arab states, Iran is arguably not
an Arab state. Therefore, the IST may not have jurisdiction to prosecute members of the
Former Regime for the crime of aggression for Iraq’s invasion of Iran.
6. Under Article 14(c) of Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the Iraqi
Special Tribunal Can Prosecute Members of the Former Regime for the
Crime of Aggression for the Invasion of Kuwait.
Before an individual may be culpable for the crime of aggression, the adjudicator
must find that the individual’s state has committed the state crime of aggression against
another state. 16 The IST can find that Iraq committed the state crime of aggression, in
violation of Article 14(c) of the IST Statute and Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958,
when it invaded Kuwait because Kuwait is an Arab state. Therefore, the IST may
prosecute officials for the crime of aggression for their participation in Iraq’s commission
of the state crime of aggression.
The IST can apply the statutory elements of Article 14 (c) of the IST Statute, in
compliance with Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958. Because of the equivalence of
Article 14 (c)’s prohibition to the international prohibition against the use of force, the
IST may consider international legal precedent in determining the outcome of specific
cases.

7. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Rejects the Defenses of Head of
State Immunity, Obedience to Government Orders, and Obedience to
Superior Orders, and Does Not Grant the Tu Quoque Defense.
16

Gomaa, note 14, at 65 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46].

5

The IST Statute’s limitations on defenses follow the precedent of international
bodies. Adopting the standard of the Nuremberg Charter and the Rome Statute, the IST
Statute does not grant head of state immunity. Following the rationale of the High
Command case, tried by a post-World War II tribunal,17 the IST Statute does not extend a
defense, but may allow mitigation of punishment, to those who committed prohibited acts
in obedience to government orders. The IST Statute echoes the Nuremberg Charter in its
refusal to extend obedience to superior orders as a defense. Finally, the IST fails to
specially extend the defense of Tu Quoque.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On September 17, 1980, Iraq declared that the Shatt al-Arab region of Iran was
part of Iraq’s territory.18 A few days later, on September 22, 1980, Iraq launched a full
military invasion of Iran, with the primary goal of regaining possession of the Shatt alArab region at the opening of the Persian Gulf. This Iraqi invasion occurred at a time of
great internal conflict within Iran.19
Within the week, the U.N. Security Council demanded that Iraq and Iran cease
fighting.20 Although Iraq was prepared to end fighting in 1982,21 Iran’s continued
17

United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (the High Command case) Judgment, 27, 28
October 1948, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, United States
Government Printing Office, 1950, vol. XI, 462-697, at 508. [hereinafter High Command case]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

18

Wikipedia, Iran-Iraq War, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Iraq_War [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 67].

19

Country Profiles: Iran, THE MIDDLE EAST, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC. 220 (8th ed. 1995).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 43].

20

S.C. Res. 479., U.N. Doc. S/RES/479 (September 28, 1980) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 14].

6

attempt to overthrow the Iraqi government prolonged the war.22 The Iran-Iraq War
finally ended with the signing of a cease-fire on August 20, 1988.
At the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq owed a total of $80 billion to other
nations,23 with a debt from $14 billion24 to $20 billion25 to Kuwait, alone. Despite this
weakness, Saddam Hussein emerged from the conflict with a stronger military and a
greater reputation among other Arab leaders.26
In considering an invasion of Kuwait at that time, Iraq had everything to gain
(including erasing large war debts and gaining up to 10% of the world’s oil production
capabilities) and little to lose (Kuwait’s military had little chance against Iraq’s massive
and war-strengthened forces). Therefore, Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. On
August 8, 1990, Saddam Hussein declared that parts of Kuwait were an annexation of the
Iraqi province of Basra and that the remainder of Kuwait constituted the 19th province of
Iraq.27
Most western nations, including the United States, eventually supported Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq War. In contrast, the international community did not support Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait. On the day of the Iraqi invasion, the United States and Kuwait

21

See Country Profiles: Iran, supra note 19, at 220 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 43].

22

Wikipedia, Iran-Iraq War, supra note 18 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 67].

23

Country Profiles: Iraq, THE MIDDLE EAST, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC. 228, 234 (8th ed. 1995)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44].

24

Wikipedia, Iran-Iraq War, supra note 18 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 67].

25

Country Profiles: Iraq, supra note 23, at 234 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44].

26

Id. at 234.

27

See Wikipedia, Gulf War, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 66].
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successfully pressured the U.N. Security Council to pass Resolution 660. Resolution 660
condemned Iraq’s invasion and demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately.28 The
following day, the League of Arab States passed a similar resolution.29 Saddam refused
to comply with international pressure to cease Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Therefore, on
January 16, the United States, operating under international authority30 and U.S.
Congressional authority, led a coalition of states31 in an invasion of Iraq.
After having successfully driven the Iraqi military from Kuwait, the coalition
ended its offensive against Iraq on February 28, 1991- a mere 100 hours after the
beginning of the coalition’s ground attack.32 In November of 1994, the Iraqi National
Assembly finally voted to accept the internationally recognized border between Iraq and
Kuwait.33

B. Background of the Definition of Aggression

28

S.C. Res. 660., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
17].
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See Wikipedia, Gulf War, supra note 27 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 66].
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S.C. Res. 678., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (November 29, 1990) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 28].
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Germany, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, the United
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The international community has formally recognized a preference for peaceful
resolution of inter-state disputes, rather than the use of force, since as early as 1907.34
After World War I, several powers enacted the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which prohibits war
and establishes pacific means as the only legitimate means to end international disputes.35
After World War II, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg prosecuted
twenty-two defendants for crimes against peace, convicting twelve defendants.36 The
Nuremberg Charter defines crimes against peace as: “namely, planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”37 The United Nations General Assembly38 and
the International Law Commission (ILC)39 later recognized and validated this definition.

34

See Laws of War: Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I) Art. 1 and Art. 2 October 18,
1907. (adhering states included Prussia, the United States, Argentina, Austria, Bohemia, Hungary,
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, India, the Hellenes, Guatemala, Haiti, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Nassau, Mexico, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, the Netherlands, Peru,
Persia, Roumania, Russia, Salvador, Servia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ottoman Empire, Uruguay,
and Venezuela) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

35

See The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) Aug. 27, 1928, available
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm (adhering states included Afghanistan, Albania,
Austria, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland,
Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama,
Peru, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Siam, Spain, Sweden, and
Turkey) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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Nuremberg Charter, supra note 12, at Art. 6 (a) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
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In December of 1945, the Control Council for Germany enacted Control Council
Number 10, which allowed for the prosecution of German criminals whom the
Nuremberg Tribunal did not prosecute.40 Control Council Number 10 recognizes crimes
against peace, which it describes as:
Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in
violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to
planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war
in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the foregoing.41
Pursuant to Control Council Number 10, the United States established American Military
Tribunals, which prosecuted four German defendants for crimes against peace.42 The
French government also created a tribunal pursuant to Control Council Number 10. This
French Tribunal conducted one trial that prosecuted for crimes against peace.43
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (“the Tokyo Tribunal”) also
recognized the crime of aggression,44 ultimately charging twenty-five defendants with
various counts of crimes against peace.45 The Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal defines
crimes against peace in language similar to that of the Nuremberg Charter. It describes
6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter, which defines crimes against peace) [hereinafter ILC Principles of
Nurnberg] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
40

HISTORICAL REVIEW, supra note 34 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 49].
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See Control Council Law No. 10 Art. II (1), at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ccno10.htm. [hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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See Id.

44

Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Art. 5. (1950), at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm. [hereinafter Tokyo Charter] [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
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crimes against peace as: “Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law,
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;”46
In 1954, the ILC drafted a Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. This draft prohibits acts of aggression, “including the employment by the
authorities of a State of armed force against another State for any purpose other than
nation al or collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a
competent organ of the United Nations.”47 The draft also states that one state’s
annexation of another state’s territory is an offence against the peace and security of
mankind.48
In more recent years, debate has surrounded the definition of the crime of
aggression. In 1974, the General Assembly recognized a definition of aggression, which
states that “[a]ggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations as set out in this Definition.”49 In
1996, the ILC issued a new Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, which specifically defined the individual crime of aggression. The 1996

46

Tokyo Charter, See supra note 44, at art. 5(a), (emphasis added to those words of the Tokyo definition
not present in the Nuremberg definition) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

47

Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1954, International Law Commission,
Report of the International Law Commission, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offfra.htm
[hereinafter 1954 ILC Draft Code] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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Id at Article 2(8).
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Res. 3314, supra note 6. at Article 1, see also infra note 57 for a list of acts that qualify as acts of
aggression [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
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definition states that “[a]n individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in
or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a
State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression.50
Despite the General Assembly’s 1974 definition of aggression and the ILC’s 1954
and 1996 prohibitions against aggression, none of the statutes for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), neither the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), nor the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SC-SL) recognize
the crime of aggression in their statutes.51 The ICTY Statute’s failure to include
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression may be related to the bombing campaign of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States and NATO bombed
Kosovo without the authorization of the U.N. Security Council, claiming humanitarian
intervention as a legal justification for the use of force.52
The Rome Statute, established in 1998, gives the International Criminal Court
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.53 However, controversy surrounding a precise

50

Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1996, International Law Commission,
Report of the International Law Commission, at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm (Article 16
defines the crime of aggression.) [hereinafter 1996 ILC Draft Code] [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 6].
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See Statute of the Int’l Criminal Trib. for Rwanda, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29]; see Statute of
the Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217 mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended by U.N.S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29]; see Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, January 16, 2002, at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
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accompanying notebook at Tab 68].
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF,183/9, art. 5(1)(d) (1998).
[hereinafter Rome Statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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definition delayed the inclusion of a precise definition of the crime of aggression until a
later date.54 The United Nations has been working on a definition, but, thus far, has been
unsuccessful in gaining approval for inclusion in the Rome Statute. Although the ICC has
projected that it will adopt a definition of the crime of aggression by 2009, Philippe
Kirsch, President of the ICC, now believes that meeting this goal is unlikely.55
Although the international community is currently debating a precise definition of
aggression for jurisdiction under the International Criminal Court, the statutes and
decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal, of the Tokyo Tribunal, and of the Control Council
Number 10 tribunals provide ample precedent of customary international law. The
United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Nuremberg definition of crimes against
peace.56 Although the Security Council has not yet ratified the ILC’s 1996 Draft Code
for Crimes Against Peace, the Draft’s definition of the crime of aggression is also a good
source of customary international law. Additionally, the International Court of Justice
has considered the General Assembly’s definition of aggression in Resolution 331457 to
be a legitimate source of customary international law.58 More conclusively, the Charter

54

Id. at art. 5(2).
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Philippe Kirsch, President of the International Criminal Court, speech at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (November 7, 2005). [notes reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
60].
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G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1. (1946). (generally affirming the
principles of Nuremberg). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8]; ILC Principles of
Nurnberg, supra note 38, at Principle VI(a) (validates Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter, which defines
crimes against peace) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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See Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 7, at 215-216 (considering G.A. Resolution 3314(g) to fairly represent
customary international law) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
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of the United Nations59 is international treaty law, which establishes the criteria that
define the crime of aggression.
III. STATE AGGRESSION
A. International Proscription Against State Aggression
5. International Definition of State Aggression
The Charter of the United Nations prohibits all member states from threatening to
use force and from using force against the “territorial integrity or political independence”
of any other state.60 Article 2(6) of the U.N. Charter imposes a responsibility on the
United Nations to ensure that non-U.N. member states also comply with the Charter, to
the extent necessary to ensure “international peace and security.”61 The United Nations
has recognized that a state’s “use of armed force” against another state’s “sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence” constitutes aggression.62 An act of
aggression includes any of the following:
(a) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting
from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the
territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of
another State;

59

See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33].

60

Id.
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Id. at art. 2, para. 6. (“The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33]; See YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 86 (3d ed. 2001) [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 45].
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Res. 3314, supra note 6 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
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(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces,
or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention
of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an
act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.63
2. Exceptions to the Prohibition Against Aggression
States may use force against other states in certain lawful circumstances.64 Legal
justification for a state threatening or using force includes obtaining UN Security Council
approval65 and exercising the state right of individual or collective self-defense.66

a. Security Council Approval of the Use of Force
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See G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 7]; See Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 7, at 213-214. (customary international
law recognizes legal use of force in some situations) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
37].
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The U.N. Charter mandates that, rather than seeking to resolve inter-state disputes
through the use of force, states must first seek peaceful resolution with the assistance of
the U.N. Security Council.67 Article 39 of the U.N. Charter grants the Security Council
the authority to approve a state’s use of force against another state. 68 The Security
Council also has the authority to determine when a state has committed an act of
aggression against another state.69 Although a state’s first use of armed force against
another state is prima facie evidence of the crime of aggression,70 the Security Council
may find that the circumstances of a situation indicate that a state has not committed an
act of aggression. 71
b. Self-Defense
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes that, until the Security Council
has the opportunity to designate a state’s illegal action as aggression, an invaded
state may individually or collectively defend itself.72 An act of armed force or an
act of aggression against the state triggers this right of self-defense.73
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U.N. CHARTER art. 33. (State parties should resolve disputes through “negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
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See U.N. CHARTER art. 39 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35].
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U.N. CHARTER art. 51 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36].

73

See Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 7, at 215 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
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Only the attacked state may invoke the right of self-defense.74 To invoke this
right, the attacked state must declare that it is the victim of another state’s act of
aggression. 75 Customary international law does not permit other states to exercise the
right to collectively defend an attacked state, until the attacked state has requested the
help of the other states.76 Once the invaded state has invoked the right of self-defense,
the invaded state gains the legal justification to use force against the illegally invading
state.77
c. Anticipatory Self-Defense
Some states claim a right to self-defense before another state launches an armed
attack. This principle, “anticipatory self-defense,” declares that a state has the right to
threaten or to use force against another state, if the state fears the threat of an immediate
armed attack.78
The Caroline incident of 1837 established the modern right of anticipatory selfdefense.79 In 1837, American sympathizers aboard the U.S. steamboat, the S.S. Caroline,
harbored Canadians who were rebelling against England, the ruling state over Canada.
While the steamboat was docked in U.S. territory, royal Canadian forces seized and
74

See Id. at 216.

75

See Id.

76

See Id.
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See J. L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
41 AM. J. INT’L L. 872, 877 (1947) (“The right of self-defense is, in such circumstances, a right to resort to
war.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 53].
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Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, INT’L & COM. L.Q. 712, 732 (1958)
(quoting letter from Webster to Fox, April 24, 1841) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
52].
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See Wikipedia, Caroline Affair, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anticipatory_self-defense
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 65].
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burned the U.S. steamboat, sending the S.S. Caroline over Niagara Falls and killing one
American.80 In retaliation, the United States burned the British steamer, Sir Robert Peel,
when it was in U.S. territory.81 The dispute ultimately ended with the signing of the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty.82
U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s response to the Caroline incident
established the requirements that anticipatory self-defense be immediate, necessary, and
proportional. In 1841, Webster argued that for England’s attack on the S.S. Caroline to
have been a legitimate act of anticipatory self-defense against the U.S., England must
show that there was a “necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.”83 Additionally, any threatened state
must limit its anticipatory self-defense to that force, which is necessary to protect the
state and proportional to the impending aggression of the other state.84
Since the Caroline incident, the principle of anticipatory self-defense has
continued as customary international law. Several states have successfully claimed
anticipatory self-defense as justification for the use of force.85 One example of a state’s
legitimate claim of anticipatory self-defense was Israel’s pre-emptive attack against the

80

Sarah Champion, Anticipatory (Pre-emptive) Self-defence: The Need for a Modern Approach, ROYAL
MILITARY COLLEGE, CANADA, available at http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE05/Champion05.html
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56].
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Egyptian army at the beginning of the 1967 Six-Day War. Egypt had visibly gathered its
forces at the borders of Israel, with the plan of invading the small state.86 In contrast, the
Security Council found Israel’s 1981 bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor to be an illegal
use of pre-emptive force because the threat was not as imminent and because Israel had
failed to exhaust peaceful means before resorting to the use of force.87
Some experts believe that the Nuremberg Tribunal recognized the legitimacy of
anticipatory self-defense.88 For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal rejected the factual
basis of Germany’s argument that Germany had attacked the Soviet Union in expectation
of the USSR’s imminent invasion into Germany. The Nuremberg Tribunal doubted that
this concern was ever a motivation for Germany’s decision to invade the U.S.S.R.89
Similarly, the Tokyo Tribunal considered but rejected Japan’s claim that its invasion of
the Netherlands East Indies was legal because Japan had anticipated that the Netherlands
would use force against Japan in the future.90
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Champion, supra note 80 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56].
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See Id.
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IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 258 (1981). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
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Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November
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Recently, the United States 2003 invasion of Iraq has raised many questions
regarding at what point a state can invade another state when it suspects that the other
state is preparing for invasion.91
d. Humanitarian Intervention
Most states believe that states have the right to use force in situations of human
rights violations.92 However, the United Nations does not formally recognize
humanitarian intervention as a legitimate justification for the use of force, absent Security
Council approval.93 Where humanitarian intervention is a sufficient justification for the
use of force against another state, the force is limited to that force which is necessary to
stop the violations against human life.94 Humanitarian intervention is not sufficient
justification for a state to conquer another state’s government, even if necessary to save
innocent lives.95
e. Illegitimate Claims of Justification for the Use of Force
The U.N. Charter and customary international law do not allow states to respond
to attacks with armed reprisals.96 Reprisals are different from self-defense in that
reprisals serve to retaliate against the original offending state. Reprisals are not necessary
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See generally Wikipedia, Preventive War, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preventive_war
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 69].
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or proportional and do not occur in the face of an immediate threat or use of force of the
other state.
The international legal community also has rejected state claims of intervention to
support the self-determination of nationals, intervention to defeat socialism, and
intervention to promote democracy.97
B. Article 14(c) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Presumes that Iraq
Should Refrain From the Use of Force Against Another Arab State.
Article 14(c) of the IST Statute presumes that Iraq should refrain from the use of
force against another Arab state. Article 14(c) states that the IST shall have power to
prosecute individuals who have committed “the abuse of position and the pursuit of
policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an
Arab country, in accordance with Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958, as amended.”98
The Article 14(c) language criminalizing the promotion of “the threat of war or
the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country,” echoes the U.N. Charter’s
proscription against the threatening or using force against another state. Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter states that “[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with Purposes of the United Nations.”99
Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958 reinforces the similarities between Article
14(c) of the IST Statute and the international prohibition against state aggression. Article
1 of Law Number 7 of 1958 states that:

97

Id. at 42-44.
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Any person holding a public position, or who was a member of parliament
or was called upon to carry out a public service and who used his
influence in committing or participating in any of the acts mentioned
below shall be considered a plotter against the security of the State:
(a) directing the country’s policy against the national interest by
bringing the country nearer the danger of war or making it a
war area.
(b) Using the country’s armed forces against the brotherly Arab
countries threatening to use such forces or instigating foreign
powers to jeopardize its security or plotting to overthrow the
existing regime or interfer [sic] in their internal affairs against
its own interests or spending money for plotting against them
or giving refuge to the plotters against them or attacking in
international fields or through publications their heads of
States.100
Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958 designates offenders as “plotter[s] against the
security of the State.”101 Article 1 continues to criminalize policy that would bring Iraq
closer to war or make Iraq a “war area.”102 Article 1 also prohibits using, or “threatening
to use” Iraq’s armed forces against “brotherly Arab countries.”103 Thus, Article 1 of Law
Number 7 of 1958 parallels the international prohibition against the threat or use of force,
as expressed in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
The list of prohibited acts included in Article 1(b) of Law Number 7 of 1958
significantly overlaps G.A. Resolution 3314’s list of acts amounting to state
aggression.104 Article 1(b) prohibits the use of Iraq’s armed forces against other Arab
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states. 105 This prohibition is analogous to Article 3(a) of Resolution 3314, which
declares that a state’s “invasion or attack” against another state constitutes aggression.106
Under Article 1(b), the IST may also prosecute defendants for acts that Resolution
3314 does not specifically recognize as aggression. Both statutes contain lists of
prohibited acts under a general proscription against the threat or use of force. However,
Article 1(b) of Law Number 7 prohibits some acts that Resolution 3314’s definition of
aggression does not designate as aggression.107 Article 1(b) prohibits individuals, acting
as agents of the Iraqi government, from “instigating foreign powers to jeopardise” the
security of that foreign Arab state, from “plotting to overthrow the existing regime” of a
foreign Arab state, and from interfering in the internal affairs of another Arab state
against the interest of that Arab state.108 Article 1(b) also prohibits individuals, acting as
agents of the Iraqi government, from spending money to plot against a foreign Arab state,
from “giving refuge to the plotters against” a foreign Arab state, and from “attacking in
international fields or through publications” the heads of states of foreign Arab states.109
None of these prohibitions is included in G.A. Resolution 3314.110
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C. The Iraqi Invasion of Iran Arguably Constituted a State Crime of Aggression
1. Iraq Used Force, Amounting to Aggression, Against Iran.
Iraq’s invasion of Iran involved one or more acts of aggression, according to G.A.
Resolution 3314’s definition.111 Under Article 3(a) of Resolution 3314, Iraq’s military
invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980 constituted an act of aggression because Iraq’s
armed forces invaded or attacked the territory of Iran.112 Additionally, Iraq’s claimed
annexation of the Shatt Al-Arab region on September 17, 1980,113 qualifies an act of
aggression, under Article 3(a).114
Article 3(b) of Resolution 3314 states that the “bombardment” of a state’s armed
forces “against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against
the territory of another State” constitutes aggression.115 In its military invasion and
continued use of force against Iran, Iraq used weapons in air attacks against Iranian cities
and used chemical weapons and biological weapons.116 Therefore, Iraq’s use of military
force and use of weapons against Iran constituted aggression.
Article 3(d) of Resolution 3314 states that the attacks of one state’s armed forces
against the “land, sea or air forces” of another state are acts of aggression.117 Iraq’s
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invasion and continued use of force against Iran involved Iraqi armed forces striking
against Iranian land, sea, and air forces. Therefore, under Article 3(d) of Resolution 3314,
Iraq committed aggression against Iran.
Finally, Article 3(g) of Resolution 3314 states that sending groups of armed bands
into the territory of another state to commit any of the prohibited acts listed in Resolution
3314(c) constitutes aggression. 118 Certainly, Iraq’s blatant use of military force against
the territory of Iran is not in dispute. However, any sending of unofficial bands of armed
individuals into Iran would also constitute aggression under Article 3(g).
However, members of the Former Regime may successfully argue that Iraq did
not commit acts of aggression toward Iran beyond 1982. After initial success, Iraq began
losing to Iran’s strong military response to Iraq’s invasion. In June 1982, Saddam
Hussein retreated to Iraqi territory and called for a cease fire, which Iran refused.119 In
July 1982, the Security Council again called for a cease-fire and called for both states to
withdraw to “internationally recognized boundaries.”120 Iraq agreed, but the prevailing
Iran refused. Although a court may find that Iraq performed acts of aggression after Iraq
offered a cease-fire in 1982, according to G.A. Resolution 3314’s definition of aggression,
the continued military threat of Iran to Iraq after 1982 may have justified any use of force
that Iraq used against Iran.
2. The International Community Condemned Iraq’s Invasion of Iran, Thus
Indicating that Iraq’s Use of Force Against Iran Was Illegitimate.
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Members of the Former Regime may argue that they cannot be culpable for the
crime of aggression because the international community has not recognized Iraq’s
invasion of Iran as a war of aggression. However, pursuant to the Security Council
Resolution 598 mandate to report to the Security Council regarding establishing an
impartial body to consider responsibility for the Iran-Iraq War,121 Secretary-General
Perez de Cuellar issued a report to the Security Council on December 9, 1991. In this
report, the Secretary General referred to Iraq’s attack on Iran as “Iraq’s aggression on
Iran.”122 The Secretary General stated that Iraq applied an “illegal use of force” against
Iran in “disregard for the territorial integrity” of Iran.123 He also said that Iraq’s
explanations for invading Iran do not satisfy the U.N. Charter or international law.124
The Secretary General’s report lends further support to the conclusion that Iraq’s invasion
of Iran was aggression.

3. Iraq’s Invasion of Iran May Fall Under A Legitimate Exception to the
General Prohibition Against Aggression.
a. The U.N. Security Council Did Not Grant its Approval to Iraq’s Use
of Force.

121

S.C. Res. 598. U.N. SCOR, 42nd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (July 20, 1987) at para. 6 [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
122

Further Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598
(1987), para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/23273 (December 9, 1991) Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
57].
123

Id. at para. 5. and para. 6.

124

Id. at para. 6. and para. 7.

26

Iraq did not gain the U.N. Security Council’s permission to invade Iran on
September 22, 1980. On the contrary, on September 28, 1980, six days after Iraq invaded,
the Security Council passed Resolution 479. Resolution 479 demanded that both Iraq and
Iran cease using force against one another.125
Without the approval of the Security Council, the only legal justifications for
Iraq’s invasion of Iran would be a legitimate claim of self-defense126 or a legitimate claim
of anticipatory self-defense.127
b. Defendants May Succeed in Arguing that Iraq’s Invasion of Iran Was
a Legitimate Act of Self-Defense.
Self-defense is a viable claim for Iraq only if Iran had committed an act of
aggression against Iraq’s “territorial integrity or political independence”128 prior to Iraq’s
September 1980 invasion into the Shatt al-Arab region.129
One possible argument that the Former Regime may raise is that Iran committed
acts of aggression during the border dispute between Iran and Iraq. While it is true that
Iraq and Iran have been involved in a border dispute for several generations,130
Resolution 3314 does not recognize a mere border dispute as sufficient justification for
the use of armed force against another state.131
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The Former Regime may succeed in arguing that Iraq invaded Iran in response to
an Iranian threat of force against the Iraqi government. When Iraq launched its full
invasion of Iran, it claimed that Iran was responsible for a recent assassination attempt
against Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.132 State responses to acts of terrorism lead to
confusion regarding whether the state response is a legitimate act of self-defense or an
illegal act of reprisal.133 However, defendants will likely point to the United States’
response of force to a 1993 assassination attempt against former President H.W. Bush.
In April of 1993, Iraqi intelligence services aided in an assassination attempt
against former President George H.W. Bush, who was visiting Iraq. According to
President Clinton, the bomb would have decimated a 400-yard radius in the middle of
Kuwait City, leading to the killing of hundreds of civilians.134 In June of 1993, President
Clinton authorized the deployment of twenty-three Tomahawk cruise missiles into
intelligence headquarters in Baghdad.135 The United States claimed the justification of
self-defense,136 and the Security Council did not condemn the U.S. bombings as
aggression.
Defendants for the crime of aggression will likely argue that an Iranian
assassination attempt against Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz justified Iraq’s use of
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force against Iran, just as the 1993 assassination attempt on the life of George H.W. Bush
justified the United States’ 1993 bombing of Baghdad.
The precedent set by the 1993 U.S. bombing of Baghdad does show that a
response of force to an assassination attempt is not necessarily an act of aggression.
However, after the U.S. bombed Baghdad in June of 1993, Iraqi Ambassador to the U.N.
Nizar Hamdoun, called the U.S. bombing an “act of aggression” and “a breach of
international law.”137
c. Iraq’s Invasion of Iran Does Not Qualify as an Act of Anticipatory
Self-Defense.
Defendants also may argue that anticipatory self-defense justified Iraq’s invasion
of Iran. For this argument to succeed, the Caroline doctrine requires that Iraq show that
Iran presented a threat that necessitated Iraq’s immediate use of force.138
Arguably, both Iran and Iraq had great incentive to increase their power in the oil
rich Arabic region. Iraqi concern over the possibility of future Iranian invasion may have
been reasonable. However, any Iranian threat to Iraqi’s territorial integrity at the time of
the Iraqi invasion was not imminent.
At the time of the Iraqi invasion, Iran had recently experienced the Iranian
Revolution and was still dealing with internal conflict.139 Iran was certainly not in a
strong position from which to embark on quests to gain more territory. Rather, the
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opposite was true. Rather than being in a position of ominous threat to Iraq, Iran seemed
to be in a position of weakness when Iraq attacked.140
4. Iraq’s Invasion of Iran Exceeded the Limits of the Legal Use of Force.
Even if Iran had presented an immediate threat necessitating Iraq to defend itself,
Iraq’s use force was not proportional to any threat that Iran presented to Iraq. A border
dispute and a (claimed) assassination attempt did not justify Iraq’s launch of a full
military attack or Iraq’s annexation of the Shatt al-Arab to Iraq.
While the U.S. responded to an assassination attempt against President George
H.W. Bush with an act of force, this response of force was proportional to the threat
against the United States. In response to a planned bombing that would have killed
President Bush and hundreds of civilians, the United States sent twenty-three missiles
into Baghdad, targeting the intelligence services that had planned the assassination
attempt. 141 Contrast this measured response of the United States to the continued
military invasion of Iraq into Iran, ultimately resulting in the deaths of thousands of
Iranians and Iraqis.142 Iraq violated international law in its grossly disproportional
response to any real threat of force or use of force that Iran committed against Iraq.

D. The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait Constituted a State Crime of Aggression.
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1. Iraq Used Force, Amounting to Aggression, Against Kuwait.
The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait Constituted Aggression, under the U.N.’s Definition
of Aggression in G.A. Resolution 3314. Iraq’s military invasion of Kuwait on August 2,
1990, constituted aggression under Article 3(a).143 Iraq’s August 8, 1990, claim to annex
Kuwait to Iraq also qualifies an act of aggression, under Article 3(a).144 Article 3(b)
establishes that Iraq’s use of armed forces and weapons against Kuwait was
aggression.145 The attacks of Iraqi armed forces against Kuwaiti land, sea, and air forces
were acts of aggression, according to Article 3(d).146 Finally, under Article 3(g) of
Resolution 3314, any unofficial bands of armed force that Iraq sent into Kuwait also
constitute aggression.147
2. The International Community Condemned Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait,
Thus Indicating the Illegality of Iraq’s Use of Force Against Kuwait.
The international community overwhelmingly condemned Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait. Although the Security Council did not classify the invasion as an act of
aggression,148 the Security Council passed Resolution 660 on August 2, 1990, the very
day of the invasion. Resolution 660 condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, saying that
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the invasion was a “breach of international peace and security.”149 As the military
conflict continued, the Security Council passed additional resolutions strengthening its
demand that Iraq cease its use of force against Kuwait.150
Individual states and regional allegiances also rejected Iraq’s use of force against
Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, the United States joined with the United Kingdom in
freezing Iraqi assets and stopping purchases of Iraqi oil.151 The League of Arab States
passed a resolution on August 3, 1990 that echoed S.C. Resolution 660’s condemnation
of the Iraqi invasion.152 The Soviet Union and the United States condemned the Iraqi
invasion and declared an international arms embargo against Iraq.153 The European
community likewise expressed its disproval by economically sanctioning Iraq.154
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3. Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait Did Not Fall Under Any of the Legitimate
Exceptions to the General Prohibition Against Aggression.
a. The U.N. Security Council Did Not Grant its Approval to Iraq’s Use
of Force.
Since the Security Council did not approve Iraq’s use of force against Kuwait, but
rather quite adamantly opposed it, 155 Iraq’s use of force against Kuwait could find
justification only in a legitimate claim of self-defense,156 in a legitimate claim of
anticipatory self-defense, or possibly, in a claim of humanitarian intervention.157
Members of the Former Regime will argue that Iraq acted in compliance with
international law because Iraq’s invasion fell under one of these recognized exceptions.
b. Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait Does Not Qualify as a Conventional Act of
Self-Defense.
A legitimate self-defense claim must show that Kuwait committed acts of
aggression prior to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. 158 Saddam Hussein
claimed that Kuwait had waged an economic war against Iraq because Kuwait had stolen
oil from Iraqi soil through “slant drilling.”159 However, according to G.A. Resolution
3314, international law does not recognize economic warfare as an act of aggression.160
Therefore, under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, Iraq cannot claim the exception of selfdefense.
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c. Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait Does Not Qualify as an Act of Anticipatory
Self-Defense.
Claims that Iraq invaded Kuwait in an act of anticipatory self-defense will fail.
At the time of the invasion in August of 1990, Iraq’s military far outnumbered Kuwait’s
forces. Iraq had recently emerged from an eight-year war with Iran, which had left Iraq
with greater numbers of internationally-provided weapons and a war-fortified military.
Kuwait, on the other hand, had a significantly smaller military. Iraq had little reason to
fear an imminent Kuwaiti act of aggression against Iraq.
d. Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait Does Not Qualify as an Act of
Humanitarian Intervention.
Iraq’s claim that humanitarian intervention justified Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
cannot succeed. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraq claimed to be freeing the Kuwaiti
people from the tyranny of the ruling Sabah family.161 The Former Regime said that it
would help organize free elections in Kuwait.162
However, this promise to bring “freedom” to the Kuwaiti people did not
materialize. Mere days after invading, Iraq declared the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq.
Additionally, the fact that Iraqis looted and brutalized the Kuwait people undermines any
Iraqi claim that the invasion was for humanitarian purposes.163
Iraq also claimed that it had justification for invading Kuwait because British
imperialism had illegitimately taken Kuwait from Iraqi territory during England’s
sovereignty over the region.164 The U.N. Charter requires parties to seek peaceful
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resolution of any inter-state disputes.165 Since international law does not recognize an
exception for the pursuit of former territory,166 this requirement applies to boundary
disputes, and Iraq’s claim that its invasion of Kuwait was a legitimate reclaiming of
former territory falls short.
4. Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait Exceeded the Limits of the Legal Use of Force.
If a court finds that Kuwait presented a legitimate and imminent threat to Iraqi
territorial integrity, a claim of anticipatory self-defense still fails because launching a full
invasion and annexing Kuwait to Iraq were not necessary or proportional to any threat
from Kuwait. Kuwait presented no military threat creating the “necessity of self-defence,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.”167
Also, a military invasion of the small state was a not proportional use of force than that
necessary to meet, even an imminent, threat that Kuwait had waged “economic
warfare”168 on Iraq.
IV. INDIVIDUAL CULPABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
A. International Definition for the Individual Crime of Aggression
Before an individual may be culpable for the crime of aggression, the adjudicator
must find that the individual’s state has committed the state crime of aggression against
another state. 169 When the ICC begins prosecuting individuals for the crime of
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aggression, it will look to decisions of the Security Council, the General Assembly, or the
International Court of Justice to first determine that the state has committed a crime of
aggression. However, the Security Council believes that only the Security Council has
the authority to determine that a state has committed aggression.170 Only after
establishing that the state has committed aggression against another state, will the ICC
consider the individual culpability for the crime of aggression.171
1. Ratione Materiae
The primary sources of authority for the individual crime of aggression are the
Nuremberg Charter and the Nuremberg Judgments.172 The Nuremberg Charter defines
individual crimes against peace as the planning, preparing, initiating, or waging a war of
aggression or a war that violates “international treaties, agreements or assurances.”173
The actions that entail planning, preparing, initiating, and waging may seem to
overlap, but these terms describe separate stages of a scheme of aggression.174 Planning
is the stage in which the offender formulates “a design or scheme for a specific war of
aggression.”175 Preparing includes “the various steps taken to implement the plan.”176
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Initiation entails actions that begin the war, and waging includes actions that occur during
the war.177
All significant modern precedents that recognize crimes of aggression list
participation in a larger scheme of aggression as sufficient grounds for criminal
culpability. Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter includes “participation in a common
plan or conspiracy” to commit the prohibited actions as an individual crime of
aggression.178 Article 16 of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind (“1996 Draft Code”) states that “an individual who…actively participates in or
orders the planning, preparing, initiation or waging of aggression…shall be held
responsible for the crime of aggression.”179
2. Ratione Personae
Once the IST has established that Iraq has committed acts of aggression, the Court
may consider the specific culpability of individuals for the crime of aggression.
Initially, international law did not require that the offender hold a position of
authority. The Nuremberg Charter extends conviction to “leaders, organizers, instigators,
and accomplices” who participated in any of the prohibited activities that define the
crime of aggression.180 Congruently, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
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for the Far East181 and Control Council Law No. 10 do not include requirements that
culpable individuals hold a position of authority. 182 The International Law Commission
also failed to recognize a requirement that individuals culpable of crimes of aggression
hold positions of authority.183 Many critics opposed the broad language of the
Nuremberg Charter, which seemed to allow for prosecution of even the common foot
soldier who fought on behalf of Nazi Germany.184
In correction of the previously broad language, current customary international
law limits prosecution of the crime of aggression to those who held positions of authority
in the government or the military of the offending state. Under the authority of Control
Council Law No. 10, an American Military Tribunal held, in the High Command case,
that only those “individuals at the policy-making level” could be guilty for the crime of
aggression.185 The High Command tribunal elaborated that only those officials who were
in positions “to shape or influence the policy” leading to an aggressive war could be
culpable for crimes against peace.186 Another American Military Tribunal, in the I.G.
Farben case, limited culpability to policy-makers and policy-executors in the government,
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the military, or industries.187 Finally, the 1996 ILC Draft Code includes a requirement
that the individual culpable of the crime of aggression be a “leader or organizer.”188
3. Mens Rea
To impose criminal culpability, the IST must find that an individual’s conduct
fulfills the requirements of mens rea, in addition to fulfilling the elements of actus reus of
the crime of aggression. Article 30 of the Rome Statute declares that mens rea is a
necessary component of criminal culpability:
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and
knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
a. In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the
conduct;
b. In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary
course of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course
of events. ‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.189
The requisite mens rea for the crime of aggression is an intent to use aggression
against another state.190 A state’s mere preparation to use force is not sufficient to
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constitute aggression, absent the intent to commit aggression.191 However, the requisite
intent to commit aggression need be present in the minds of only a few officials. Other
officials at the policy-making level need only have knowledge of the scheme to engage in
aggression, to be culpable for the crime of aggression.192
The Nuremberg Tribunal held that rearmament does not constitute aggression,
unless officials intend the rearmament to assist in a plan of a war of aggression.193
Similarly, the Tokyo Tribunal emphasized that a goal of acquiring control or domination
over another state is characteristic of waging a war of aggression.194
B. Article 14(c) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Establishes
Jurisdiction Over Crimes Roughly Equivalent to the Individual Crime of
Aggression.
Article 14(c) of the IST Statute, together with Article I of Law Number 7 of 1958,
establishes the elements of a crime that fit the international definition of the crime of
aggression. Echoing the Nuremberg Charter, the IST Statute clearly prohibits direct or
participatory actions195 that might lead Iraq to use force in one of the prohibited acts
listed in Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958.196
In congruence with international legal precedent, the IST Statute requires that the
culpable individual hold a position of authority. Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958
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enables the Iraqi Special Tribunal to find culpable offending public officials, parliament
members, or those who performed a public service for the Iraqi government.197
C. Under Article 14(c) of Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the Iraqi Special
Tribunal May Not Be Able to Prosecute Members of the Former Regime for
the Crime of Aggression for the Invasion of Iran Because Iran is Not an Arab
State.
Although the IST can also arguably find that Iraq’s invasion of Iran was an act of
aggression based on international legal precedent,198 the IST does not have jurisdiction to
prosecute individuals for Iraqi invasions of states that are not Arab states. Article 14(c)
of the IST Statute and Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958 give the IST jurisdiction to
prosecute individuals only for Iraqi invasions of “Arab countries.”199
The international community does not view Iran as an Arab state. Iran is not
presently, nor has it ever been, a member of the League of Arab States.200 Additionally,
only 3% of Iranians consider themselves to be Arabic.201
Iran is arguably not an Arab state because Iran does not meet all the criteria of
Arab states. One element that defines an Arab state is a sharing a central history of “the
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mission of Muhammad.”202 The IST may argue that Iran is Arabic by virtue of sharing
Islam with the majority of Arab states. However, religion is only one of several factors
that a state must have to be Arab.203 Islam, alone, is an insufficient basis for a
designation of “Arabic,” as evidenced by the common recognition of “Arab
Christians.”204 Additionally, even Iran’s practice of Islam differs from the majority of the
Arabic world. The predominant observance of the Islamic religion in Iran is Shi’a,205
while the majority of Arab states practice Sunni Islam.206
Other criteria that determine whether or not a state is Arab are “a common
territory, language, and culture.”207 Iran does not share these other Arab characteristics.
Unlike any of the Arab states, Iran is part of the land mass of Asia. Iran’s predominant
language is Persian, with Arabic composing only 1% of spoken languages in Iran.208
Also, citizens of Iran largely do not identify with the Arab culture, with Persians
composing 51% of Iran’s population and Arabs composing only 3% of the state’s
population.209
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D. Under Article 14(c) of Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the Iraqi Special
Tribunal Can Prosecute Members of the Former Regime for the Crime of
Aggression for the Invasion of Kuwait.
The Iraqi Special Tribunal may prosecute Iraqi authority figures for the crime of
aggression for Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. After reaching a conclusion
that Iraq committed the state crime of aggression in its invasion into Iraq or in its
invasion into Kuwait, the Court may consider the culpability of individuals who
participated in that state crime.210
Since the IST can arguably find that Iraq’s invasions of Kuwait were state acts of
aggression,211 the IST may find individuals culpable. The IST will then consider the
evidence and facts to determine whether each individual’s actions amounted to the
individual crime of aggression, as described in Article 14(c) of the IST Statute.
V. DEFENSES
A. Available Defenses
Defendants that the Iraqi Special Tribunal prosecutes for the crime of aggression
will depend primarily on claims that Iraq did not commit state aggression against Iran and
that Iraq did not commit state aggression against Kuwait.
Even if the state has committed a crime of aggression, an accused individual still
may argue that he or she is not guilty via other defenses. Individual defenses available to
criminal defendants in the IST may reflect the Rome Statute. Article 31 of the Rome
Statute recognizes several defenses for individual criminality, which include mental
incapacity; intoxication; necessary defense of self, of another person, or of property; and

210

Gomaa, supra note 14, at 65 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46].

211

See discussions and conclusions regarding Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, supra.

43

duress.212 Additionally, international law recognizes the defenses of mistake of law213
and mistake of fact.214
B. Impermissible Defenses
1. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Specifically Rejects Head of
State Immunity as a Defense.
International legal precedent does not recognize head of state immunity for the
crime of aggression. Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter states that the Nuremberg
Tribunal would not grant immunity to a head of state or mitigate an individual’s
punishment because the individual committed the prohibited actions as a head of state or
as another government official.215 The Rome Statute also clearly disavows head of state
immunity.216
Similarly, the Statute of the IST does not allow head of state immunity. Article
15(c) states that an individual’s official position “as president, prime minister, member of
the cabinet, chairman or a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, a member of
the dissolved Ba’ath Party Command or Government will not relieve the individual of
culpability and will not mitigate a culpable individual’s punishment.”217
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2. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Specifically Rejects Obedience
to National Law as a Defense.
International legal precedent allows for the defense of obedience to national law.
Where domestic law contradicts international criminal law, the citizen must obey the
international laws.218 The American Military Tribunal that decided the High Command
case stated that “[a] directive to violate international criminal law is therefore void and
can afford no protection to one who violates such law in reliance on such a directive.” 219
The Iraqi Special Tribunal also does not extend this defense to defendants. Article
15(e) of the Statute of the IST states that the fact that a defendant’s actions were in
compliance with a government order will not relieve that defendant of criminal
culpability.220 However, the Court may mitigate the punishment of defendant who acted
in obedience to government orders. 221
3. The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Specifically Rejects Obedience
to Orders as a Defense.
The Nuremberg Charter stated that it would not extend criminal immunity to
individuals who had acted pursuant to superior orders. However, the Charter allowed
obedience to superior orders to be a mitigating factor in determining punishment.222
Recently, the International Law Commission upheld Nuremberg’s denial of a criminal
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defense based on obedience to orders.223 The International Criminal Court grants
immunity to inferiors obeying superior orders, only when three conditions are present:
the individual “was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the government or the
superior;” the individual “did not know that the order was unlawful;” and “the order was
not manifestly unlawful.” 224
Article 15(e) of the IST Statute bans the criminal defense that an accused
individual performed prohibited acts in obedience to superior orders.225 However, the
IST may mitigate the punishment for such actions.226
4. The Charter of the Iraqi Special Tribunal Does Not Recognize a Tu
Quoque Defense.
The Tu Quoque defense is the argument that a defendant cannot be convicted for a
crime for which the prosecuting party is also culpable. While the IST does not
specifically reject a Tu Quoque defense, the IST also fails to grant the Tu Quoque
defense.227 International precedent regarding the viability of the Tu Quoque defense is
mixed. The Federal Supreme Court of Germany recognized the defense in 1960. 228
However, more recently, the ICTY has dismissed the defense.229 Defendants here may
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attempt to raise the Tu Quoque argument that the United States use of force in the
invasion of Iraq was illegal, and, therefore, the IST may not try and convict members of
the Former Regime for the invasions of Iran and Kuwait. However, this argument should
fail because Iraq, rather than the U.S., will be prosecuting members of the Former
Regime.230
VI. CONCLUSION
The language of Article 14(c) of the IST Statute, combined with the language of
Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958, closely tracks international legal precedents
prohibiting the state crime of aggression. Therefore, the IST prohibits acts of state
aggression.
Iraq’s claims of justification of the invasions of Iran and Kuwait fail. Because
Iraq’s invasion of Iran was not approved by the Security Council, did not meet the
requirements of self-defense, and did not meet the requirements of anticipatory selfdefense, Iraq’s invasion of Iran and its annexation of the Shat al-Arab region constituted
the state crime of aggression. The same absence of defenses applies to Iraq’s invasion
and annexation of Kuwait. Additionally, Iraq’s claim of humanitarian intervention in
Kuwait fails. For these reasons, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait also constituted the state crime
of aggression.
The language of Article 14(c) of the IST Statute, combined with the language of
Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958, establishes the IST’s jurisdiction over crimes
roughly equivalent to the crime of aggression. Thus, the IST may find that Iraq
committed the state crime of aggression when it invaded Iran and when it invaded Kuwait,

230

Id.

47

the IST may prosecute officials for the crime of aggression for their participation in Iraq’s
commission of the state crime of aggression.
Finally, the IST does not recognize head of state immunity, obedience to
government orders, or obedience to superior orders as defenses, so those defenses would
not be available to officials charged with these the crime of aggression.
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